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INVARIANCE PROPERTIES OF SOLOW'S PRODUCTIVITY RESIDUAL
ABSTRACT
In1957, Robert Solow published a paper that provided the theoretical foun-
dation for almost all subsequent work on productivity measurement.
Although most applications of Solow's method have measured trends over
fairly long time periods, the method also has important uses at higher
frequencies. Under constant returns to scale and competition, the Solow
residual measures the pure shift of the production function. Shifts in product
demand and factor supplies should have no effect on the residual. Tests of
this invariance property show that it fails in a great many industries.
Though other explanations may deserve some weight, it appears that the
leading cause of the failure of invariance is increasing returns and market







Solow [1957] developed what is now the dominant approach to the
measurement of productivity growth. To measure the shift of the production
function, Solow pointed out, one can simply subtract a Divisia index of input
growths from output growth.Key assumptions of the derivation are
competition and constant returns to scale. Solow thought of his method as a
way to measure the trend in productivity. Hetook the average rate of
growth of the Solow residual as the best measure of the average rateof
growth of the Hicks-neutral multiplicative component of the production
function. From the start, users of the Solow residual were aware that it
tended to follow the business cycle; in years of expansion, the residual is
unusually large; in years of recession, it is low or even negative. My purpose
in this paper is to consider the lessons that can be learned from the year-to-
year fluctuations in the Solow residual.
Under Solow's assumptions, the following theorem holds:The
productivity residual is uncorrelated with any variable that is uncorrelated with the
rate of growthoftrue productivity. The theorem is just a restatement of
SolOw's basic result that the residual measures the shift of the production
function.It says, in particular, that productivity growth should be
uncorrelated with any variable that is a driving force for output, provided
that the variable is not one that shifts the production function. For example,
in the face of an exogenous upward shift in the demand for a particular
industry's output, the productivity of that industry should remain
unchanged. Or, if the price of one of the factors used by the industry rises
sharply, productivity should also remain unchanged.
Among U.S. industries, the Solow residual is correlated with exogenous
product demand and factor price movements. The invariance property fails
conspicuously. Most of this paper explores the alternative reasons for the
1failure. Each explanation relates to a failure of the assumptions underlying
Solow's orginal derivation, Two critical assumptions are competition and
constant returns. It turns out that there is a variant of the Solow residual
that handles the case of a firm or industry with market power but constant
returns. Invariance of the modified Solow residual fails just as strongly as
does invariance of the original Solow residual. Hence the evidence points in
the direction of increasing returns, presumably coupled with market power.
Another important explanation for the observed failure of invariance
of the Solow residual (original or modified) is that the supposedly exogenous
movements in product demand or factor supplies are actually causally related
to the stochastic shifts in the technology. This explanation comes in two
variants.First, product demand shifts may be a response to changes in
technology. If government purchases of the output of an industry are the
exogenous variable used to check the invariance property, it is possible that
exogeneity fails because the government purchases more output in times
when the technology is unusually favorable.Second, movements of the
exogenous variable may trigger shifts in the technology. Externalities are the
obvious example.If one industry's production function depends on the
output of other industries, through thick market effects, then an increase in
government product demand will operate through the externality.
Mismeasurement of inputs and outputs is another explanation of the
failure of the invariance of the Solow productivity residual.Errors in
measuring output that are positively correlated with the exogenous variable
would explain the failure of invariance. For example, if firms use their
workers to build tangible and intangible capital when they are not busy
making output,. then invariance would fail; the rise in measured output
following a stimulus to demand would overstate the rise in actual output
because unmeasured investment would fall. Errors in measuring labor input
could also explain the failure of invariance. Actual hours worked by salaried
employees may fluctuate even though their reported hours are steady;
because they are not paid by the hours, there is no reason to keep close track
2of actual hours. Work effort per hour may also vary in a way that makes
measured labor input less responsive to exogenous shifts in demand than true
labor input. Similarly, errors in measuring the use of capital services may
understate the variability of that input and explain the failure of invariance.
1.Solow's method
Consider a firm that produces output Q with a production function eF(K,
N) using capital K and labor N as inputs. eisan index of Hicks-neutral
technical progress. The firm faces a stochastic demand for its output,
possibly perfectly elastic. It faces a labor market where the firm can engage
any amount of labor at the same wage, w. Sometime in advance of the
realization of demand, the firm chooses a capital stock. I do not assume
anything about the market for capital goods nor, for that matter, do I assume
that the firm's investment policy is optimal. However, I do assume that the
pure user cost of capital is zero—capital depreciates over time,not in relation
to use. I also assume that the firm chooses its labor input so as to maximize
profit and that the choice is made after the realization of demand. Finally,I
assume that there is at least one observable variable that shiftsthe demand
schedule, the labor supply schedule, or the level of capital used by the firm
and is uncorrelated with the rate of technical progress.
Solow's [1957] famous paper derived a relationship involving output
growth, product price, capital and labor input, and the wage rate, underthe
assumptions of competition and constant returns to scale. The relationship is
— — (1—a*)kt = 0 (1.1)
whereAqisthe rate of growth of output (log Q), aisthe factor share
earned by labor (ratio of compensation wN to total revenue pQ),An isthe
rate of growth of labor (Alog N), and 9 is the rate of Hicks-neutral technical
3progress(log e).Solowrecommended evaluating the left side in order to
measure the rate of growth of productivity. This measure has come to be
known as total factor productivity because, unlike measures that consider
only output and labor input, it accounts for capital input and, in a more
general form, for all other types of inputs.
The statistic on the left side of equation 1.1 is the "Solow residual." It is
the difference between the rate of growth of output and the weighted rates of
growth of the inputs. Under competition and constant returns, the observed
share of labor is an exact measure of the elasticity of the production function
with respect to labor. Without any further restriction on the production
function, the elasticity can be read directly from the data on compensation
and revenue. From constant returns, the elasticity of the production function
with respect to capital input is just 1 minus the labor elasticity. Once the
labor elasticity is known, the rate of growth of total input can be formedas
the rate of growth of labor, weighted by the labor elasticity, plus the rate of
growth of capital, wwighted by the capital elasticity. Then the rate of
productivity growth can be obtained by subtracting the rate of growth of
total input from the rate of growth of output.
Solow had in mind the calculation of the rate of growth of productivity, 9,
separatelyfor each year. Because productivity growth seems to have a
substantial random element, it is natural to view 9asthe sum of a constant
underlying growth rate, 9,anda random term, ug.Then equation 1.1
becomes
— — (1—)k = 0 + ut (1.2)
Nowsuppose there is a variable, say which is an important outside
determinant of output and employment. It could be government purchases of
the output of this industry, or a measure of the shift of labor supply to the
industry, or something else that affects qandn. Suppose further that the
variable z is exogenous to this equation; that is, it is uncorrelated with the
4stochastic element of productivity growth, u. In other words, the variable
/zisof a type which is known from prior reasoning not to cause shifts in
productivity nor to be influenced by productivity shifts that come from other
sources.Later in the paper I will suggest that the change in military
spending is one such variable. If the variable Az has zero correlation with
the right side of equation 1.2, it must have zero correlation with the left side
as well. This establishes:
Proposition 1. Invariance of the Solow residual: Under competition and
constant returns to scale, the Solow residual is uncorrelated with all
variables known to be neither causes of productivity shifts nor to be
caused by productivity shifts.
When a convincingly exogenous variable is found to be correlated with the
Solow residual, it refutes the joint hypothesis of competition and constant
returns. Later I will investigate the power of the test and the interpretation
of rejection.I will demonstrate the following:For the case of an
instrumental variable iz which is positively correlated with output and
employment, a positive correlation of izandthe Solow residual could be a
sign of market power. The evidence on the failure of invariance of the cost-
based Solow residual will suggest that increasing returns is an important part
of the story; there is not enough profit in most industries to reconcile market
power with constant returns.
2. The modified Solow residual
Invariance of the original Solow residual may fail because of market
power, increasing returns, or other reasons. Inthe case of market power,
achieved through government restrictions on entry or by other means,
together with constant returns, the earnings of the firms should include an
5element of monopoly profit as well as the normal return to capital. A second
explanation for the failure of invariance is that entry is free, but the
technology has increasing returns. Then the equilibrium will involve just
enough market power to pay for the inputs. Earnings will not exceed the
normal return to capital.
A very simple strategy can tell the two explanations apart. Under
constant returns to scale (no fixed costs), the telltale cyclical behavior of the
Solow residual should disappear once a simple modification is made in the
computation of the residual. The modification is to measure labor's share in
relation to cost rather than revenue.Because cost will be lower than
revenue, the cost-based share will exceed the revenue-based share; the cyclical-
ity of the Solow residual will vanish once a higher share is applied to labor
growth. On the other hand, with fixed costs and free entry, revenue and cost
will be the same, so the cost-based Solow residual will have the same cyclical
behavior as the original revenue-based one. When the cost-based Solow
residual has almost as large a failure of invariance as the orginal residual, it
means that the technology has increasing returns.
Later I will show that the second approach yields an estimate of the
index of returns to scale. These estimates exceed three in quite a number of
industries. Fixed costs or other types of increasing returnsappear to be an
important feature of some industries.
Cost-based shares
As a prelude to the derivation of the modified, cost-based Solow
residual, it is helpful to review some of the details of Solow's original
derivation. Suppose output, Q, is produced by capital, K, and labor,N, in
accord with the constant-returns production function, F
Q =F(K,N). (2.1)
6Solow approximated the change in output as
K8FK + N8FtN 22 -
Asbefore, define lower-case letters as the logarithms of the corresponding
upper-case variables. Then, still following Solow,
=k÷n. (2.3)
Let the firm be a price-taker in the capital services market at rental price r
and in the labor market at wage w. Conditions for the minimization of cost
OF_r d 8F_w 24 —an
HereA is a Lagrangian interpreted as marginal cost. Solow assumed that A
was observable as the market price of output. Instead, I will treat A as
unobservable and use data on the service price of capital, which is not needed
in Solow's approach. With r given, and with constant returns, it is possible
to solve for the marginal products:
OF_ wQ —Q. 25 rk+wNW'
OF_ rQ —ii— 26 Krk+wN' a/K.
Here a is the share of labor cost, wN, in total factor cost, wN+ rK. Solow
measured the elasticity of output with respect to labor input by labor's share
in revenue.That measure is appropriate under competition.In this
approach, I measure the elasticity of output with respect to labor as labor's
share in cost. No assumption of competition is required.
I can now state the basic relationship underlying the method:
7= an+(1 — a)k + 9. (2.7)
The percent change in output is the weighted percent changes in inputs. The
weights for the inputs are the corresponding cost shares, aand1— a. From
equation 2.7 it is apparent that the cost-based Solow residual is invariant to
exogenous changes in output. Only true shifts of the production function
make the residual depart from zero. In comparison to the original Solow
residual, the cost-based Solow residual has the important property that it
measures the shift of the production function correctly in the presence of
market power. Solow's original approach has the disadvantage of recording
false movements of the production function for firms with market power,
even with constant returns to scale. When revenue exceeds cost, because of
pure monopoly profit, the revenue share of labor understates the elasticity of
output with respect to labor input. When some exogenous event raises labor
input relative to capital input, the revenue-based Solow residual fails to
account for all of the increase in output, because it gives too little weight to
labor.
Stochastic investment
The previous derivation assumed that there was an observed rental
cost of capital, r, to which firms equated the marginal product of capital at
all times. Because of lags between launching investment projects and putting
new facilities into service, this assumption is unrealistic. The true cost share
of labor, a,cannotbe observed because it requires that capital cost be
measured as the shadow cost of capital (capital's realized marginal product).
But a has an observed counterpart,
a— wN (28) rk+wN
8Here r is an observed cost of capital containing a random expectation error, c.
The expectation error arises from the lags in the investment process. The
quantity of capital is set in advance, based on expectations of the demand
schedule facing the firm and the interest rate and other determinants of the
rental price of capital. The realized marginal product of capital differs by e.
Although has rational expectations properties, these properties cannot be
exploited in this research, because and and the random technology shift, 9,
appear together.
Some algebra shows that the difference between the true labor share
and the observed one is
a —& = —(1 — &)aE. (2.9)
Then the relation among the observed variables is:
=&ón—(1 — &)ik+ (1— &)ac(in—k)+ 9 (2.10)
Thefactor (1 —&)isclose to a constant. Suppose there is an instrumental
variable that is a candidate for testing invariance—its movements do not
cause changes in true productivity, 9,andchanges in productivity do not
cause its movements. Such an instrument is certainly correlated with the
expectation error, c, and with the change in the labor-capital ratio, An—ik.
Nonetheless, it is a reasonable identifying assumption that an instrument is
uncorrelated with the product, c(n—ik), for the following reason. The
product is positive in good times (when both its factors are positive) and is
positive as well in bad times (when both its factors are negative). The
instrument will be positive in good times and negative in bad times. Hence
its correlation with the product will be close to zero. More generally, if the
three random variables c, n—ik, and the instrument have a symmetric joint
distribution, the correlation will be exactly zero, because the correlation is a
third moment.
9The Solow residual, when measured with the observed cost share, is
—àn—(1—&)k=—(1—&)af(n—k) + 9 . (2.11)
I have already argued that the other two terms should be uncorrelated with a
properly chosen instrument. Consequently, the following result is established:
Proposition 2.Invariance of the cost-based Solow residual. Under
constant returns to scale, the cost-based Solow residual is uncorrelated
with an instrumental variable, irrespective of the amount of market
power.
3. Value added
In addition to the labor and capital considered in the previous sections,
firms use materials and other intermediate products as inputs to production.
When time series data on other inputs are available, it is a simple matter to
add additional terms to the Solow residual, each containing a factor share
multiplying a rate of growth of an input. But it is also possible to make use
of annual data on nominal and real value added in place of full input-output
data. This section modifies the earlier analysis to deal with that case. In
this section, variables withsignify measures of the theoretical ideal: Q is
true gross output, q* is the log of Q*,isthe actual price of output, $'and
*arethe factor shares of materials and labor relative to the value of gross
output, p*Q*,and9* is the rate of Hicks-neutral technical progress in the
production function relating gross output to all inputs. Also, v is the price of
materials, M is the quantity of materials employed and m is the log of the
materials-capital ratio. With competition and constant returns, the Solow
residual calculated with the full data is:
10= 0* (3.1)
Inthe case at hand, the output measure that is available is not Q*, gross
output, but is Q, real value added. Nonetheless, it can be shown that the test
based on the simple Solow residual, computed from real value added and
employment growth, is a valid test. The rate of growth of the ratio of real
value added is
—— P*Q*_VM 32 q———_p*Q*_VM
vM iM
-1-s
Recallthat j3* is the share of materials in the value of gross output, vM/p*Q*.
Thus
—_______ q—




11Here a is the labor's share in value added (a=a*/(1_/3*)) and 9 isthe rate of
technical progress stated in labor-capital augmenting form (9=9*/(1I3*)).
Equation3.5 says the following: Under competition and constant returns, the
Solow residual calculated from value added will be equal to the rate of
technical progress, appropriately defined.The covariance of the Solow
residual with an exogenous instrument will be zero under competition and
positive under market power. Thus we have
Proposition 3. Invariance of the Solow residual computed fromvalue
added: Under competition and constant returns, the Solow residual
calculated from data on real value added as the measure of output and
shares in nominal value added as measures of elasticities is uncorrelated
with any instrument.
On the other hand, the cost-based Solow residual does not have an exact
invariance property when calculated from value added, but invarianceholds
as a very close approximation.Consider equation 3.1 with the shares
computed in relation to total cost, wN+rK+vM. Equation 3.3 becomes
=q*7fl (3.6)
whereis the share of materials in revenue, vM/p* Q*• Then the cost-based
Solow residual, using value-added data, is
q—azn—(1—a)Lk =/1*,r[m_ain_(1_a)k] + 9 (3.7)
Here7isthe ratio of pure profit to value added,
—p*Q*_wN_rK_vM (38) —
P*Q*_VM
Two comments are in order. First, the failure of invariance of thecost-based
12Solow residual depends on the pu.re profit rate, '.Ifa firm or industry has
little pure profit, then the failure of invariance of the cost-based residual
cannot occur because of problems with the use of value added. The problems
arise only in industries that earn profits in excess of all factor costs,including
the market cost of capital. Second, even if profit is high, invariance failsonly
when materials do not move in proportion to output. If iXqandLm are
equal, then the term in brackets is itself the productivity residual. In that
case, the residual is just a multiple of the true productivity shift, and so it
will obey invariance. I summarize in
Proposition 4. Approzimate invariance of the cost-based Solow residual
computed from value added: If profit is low or materials are close
complements to output, then the cost-based Solow residual computed
from value added is close to uncorrelated with any instrument.
The discussion in this section made the implicit assumption that the
change in real value added was computed each year using the previous year's
prices as the base prices (see equation 3.2). In effect, it assumed the use of a
Divisia index of real value added. In the U.S. national incomeaccounts, base
prices are changed about once a decade. I know of no reason to think that
the low frequency of base changes has any important influenceon the results
obtained by the technique in this research.
4. Instrumental variables
The empirical results of my research and related work are of two
types. The first show the failure of the invariance property by constructing
Solow residuals and showing that they are positively correlated with
instruments that themselves are positively correlated with output. The
second measures the extent of market power and increasing returnsby
13estimating parameters that describe them.
The null hypothesis of invariance is refuted by finding a positive
correlation between the productivity residual and an exogenous instrument.
Econometrically, the simplest way to test for the absence of correlation is to
calculate the regression coefficient of the productivity residual on the
instrument and use the i-test for inference. The instrumental variables for
the test should cause important movements in employment and output but
be uncorrelated with the random fluctuations in productivity growth. Such
exogenous variables could operate through productdemand or through factor
supplies. Lack of correlation with the random element of productivity growth
involves two considerations:First, the instrument must not -cause
movements in productivity.Second, it must not respond to random
variations in productivity growth.
It is a challenge to find instruments that are plainly exogenous under all
views of macroeconomic fluctuations and which also have large enough
influences on employment and output so that the test is powerful. Recent
research has cast doubt on the exogeneity of all measures of monetary policy
that are much correlated with output. On the fiscal side, only military
spending is arguably unresponsive to the current state of employmentand
output. No single assumption is likely to appeal toall schools of thought
about the relation between productivity growth and output. fluctuations. A
set of instruments suggested by Valerie Ramey has proven useful inthis
research.
Military spending
Militaryspending undergoes occasional large fluctuations that do not
appear to be driven by the business cycle or byfluctuations in productivity.
In addition, there is no reason to think that increases in government
purchases of certain products should shift the productionfunctions for the
industries making those products, at least from one year to the next. Were
14military spendingsufficiently correlated with
employment and output, it probably would be the most
persuasive instrument for thepurposes of this paper. In addition to
government purchases ofgoods, which operatethrough product markets, changesin military
employment help identify theequation through fluctuations transmittedvia the labor market.
The world oil price
It is reasonable toassume that the historicalpattern of shifts in the world price of oil hasnot been caused in
any important way by fluctuations in U.S. productivity
growth. The otherpart of the argumentsupporting the rate of change of the oilprice as an instrument holdsthat shifts in oilprices do not causechanges in productivity.That hypothesis ismore controversial. Its justification isthat changes in factorprices do not shiftproduction functions in the shortrun. Under this hypothesis,the observedtendency for measured productivityto fail when oil pricesrise is the result of thenegative response of output to that rise.
The political partyof the President
Systematic differences ineconomic policies of thetwo political parties have caused differencesin rates of expansionof the industries
considered here, both over time andacross industries. Outputof services,durables, and regulated industries have
risen noticeably fasterunder Democrats thanunder Republicans. Under the
reasonable hypothesis thatneither party hasadopted policies that affect
productivity growth in theshort run, thissystematic difference can be usedto test the joint
hypothesis of competitionand constant returns.
155. Econometricmethod
Under the basic identifying
hypothesis that trueshifts in productivity are
unrelated to movementsof the instrumentalvariable, testing ofthe joint
hypothesis of competitionand constant returnsis a simple matterof testing
the hypothesis that
the covariance of theSolow residual zq—cm—(1—c)ik
and the instrument ziszero. Althoughthe test could beconducted with
the raw covariance itself,an equivalentand more easily interpretable
test is
based on the regression
coefficient of the Solowresidual on the instrument.
Thus, the tests aret-tests for the exclusionof the instrumentsfrom the
regressions.
6. Data
I have obtained annualdata for 7 one-digit industrygroups and26
industries at roughly the
two-digit level forthe years 1953-84.The industry
detail is controlled bythe labor input measure,
which is an unpublished
compilation of hoursof work for all workers,including supervisory
workers.
The series are:
Q: Real valueadded, 1982 dollarsU.S. National Incomeand
Product Accounts
K: Net real capitalstock, Bureau ofEconomic Analysis.
p: Implicitdeflator with indirectbusiness taxes removed (ratioof
nominal value added lessIBT to real value added)
N: Hours of workof all employees, U.S.NIPA
w: Total compensationdivided by N
16Note that the data are chosen to eliminate tax wedges as a source of
departures of marginal cost from price. The price level is measured net of
sales and other taxes, and the wage is measured gross of social security,
fringes, and other costs incurred by the employer. The industries chosen
were the most detailed for which the NIPA report hours of all employees.
The only series used in the construction of the cost-based Solow
residual that is not required for the original Solow residual is the rental price
of capital. Construction of the rental price follows Hall and Jorgenson [1967].
The formula relating the rental price to its determinants is:
r= (p+ 6) 1 -k-rd. (6.1)
The determinants are:
p: The firm's real cost of funds, measured as the dividend yield ofthe
S&P 500 portfolio;
6: The economic rate of depreciation, 0.127, obtained from Jorgenson
and Sullivan [1981], Table 1, p. 179;
k: The effective rate of the investment tax credit, from Jorgenson and
Sullivan, Table 10, p. 194;
d: The present discounted value of tax deductions for depreciation,
from Jorgenson and Sullivan, Table 6, pp. 188-189;
PK: The deflator for business fixed investmentfrom the U.S. National
Income and Product Accounts.
17Use of the dividend yield as the real cost of funds is justified by two
considerations: First, the great bulk of investment is financed through equity
in the form of retained earnings. Second, the use of a market-determined real
rate avoids the very substantial problems of deriving an estimated real rate
by subtracting expected inflation from a nominal rate. The dividend yield is
a good estimate of the real cost of equity funds whenever the path of future
dividends is expected to be proportional to the price of capital goods. For the
typical firm, this is an eminently reasonable hypothesis. Of course, for firms
with low current dividend payouts and high expected growth, the dividend
yield understates the real cost of funds. But these firms are counterbalanced
by mature firms whose payouts are high and whose growth rates are below
the rate of inflation.
The instrumental variables are:
Rate of increase of the world price of crude petroleum in dollars.
Rate of growth of military purchases of goods and services in real
terms.
A dummy variable with the value of 1 when the President is a
Democrat and zero when a Republican.
7. Summarij of results
Table 1 summarizes the empirical evidence on the invariance of the
original Solow residual and the cost-based modification. Much more detailed

























Tests of invariance of original and cost-based Solow residuaL9:











Industry Spending Price Party Spending Price Party




22: Textile mill 0.2530.0820.170
products
23: Apparel and other 0.2080.6140.591
textile mill products
24: Lumber and wood 0.6320.2500.096
25: Furniture 0043R 0.0630.447
26: Paper and allied0.1910.0041? 0.271
products
27: Printing and 0.0680.0810.500
publishing
28: Chemicals and 0.1840.00l? 0.291
allied products
29: Petroleum 0.053 0001R 0.425
and coal
30: Rubber and misc.0.2850.2370.246
plastic products


















Industry Spending Price Party Spending Price Party
32: Stone, clay and 0.3570•002R 0.379 0.177 O.OOS 0.565
glass products
33: Primary metals 0.1550.3410.221 0.2720.3690.233
34: Fabricated metals 0.2650.0920.304 0.0750•001R 0.143
35: Machinery, except 0.7480.065 0.624 0.3110•041R 0.242
electrical
36: Electric and 0.2520•027R 0.038 0.3090•022R 0.033
electronic equipment
38: Instruments and0.478 0.7230.362 0.4940.124 0.312
related products
39: Miscellaneous 0.4520.1440.075 0.1950.00l' 0.076
manufacturing
48: Communication 0.3560.2160.674 0.3410.1440.665
49: Electric, gas and0.4400.2080.202 0.457 0.0600.586
sanitary services
371: Motor vehicles 0.3690.1240.376 0.2850.1120.383
and equipment
372-79: Other 0.4550.5570.669 0.6880•024R 0.441
transportation equipment
21The three columns on the left report the results of the joint tests of
competition and constant returns, based on the original Solow residual. Each
column corresponds to one of the three instruments. The three columns on
the right report the results for the test of constant returns using the cost-
based residual. An R means that the one-tailed test rejected at the 5 percent
level in the direction of market power or increasing returns; that is, the
covariance of the productivity residual and the instrument was significantly
positive when the sign of the instrument was normalized so as to make its
covariance with output growth positive.
In Table 1, it is evident that the results for the original and cost-based
Solow residuals are very similar.The reason is simple. The difference
between the two residuals depends on the level of pure profit —profit beyond
the normal return to capital. Few industries have much pure profit, so the
difference between the revenue share of labor and the cost share of labor is
small. The absence of pure profit in most cases means that market power
with constant returns is probably not a good explanation of the findings. If
there is market power, it must be offset by fixed costs or other types of
increasing returns.
The military spending instrument provides some evidence against
invariance in most industries, though rarely at high levels of significance. In
most industries, a change in demand induced by a change in military
spending raises productivity if it raises output, and viceverBa.This finding is
inconsistent with the assumptions underlying the invariance theorems. The
political party instrument, which also considers changes in product demand
and labor supply, provides weak evidence against invariance in a number of
industries. The oil price instrument yields the strongest evidence against
invariance. In most of the one-digit industries and a large number of the
two-digit industries, changes in the world oil price coincide with changes in
productivity. Because factor prices do not shift production functions, this
finding is a paradox within the assumptions of Solow's approach to
productivity measurement.
228. Interpretation of rejection of the invariance hypothesis
Contrary to the predictions of theory, invariance of the Solow residual
(either in original or cost-based form) fails. In most industries, expansions in
response to outside forces involve a much larger increase in output than
would be expected from the observed increase in labor input, based on the
use of labor's share as an estimate of the elasticity of output with respect to
labor input. This section considers a number of explanations of the failure of
invariance.
Ezplanaiion 1: Market power
The basic idea that Solow exploited in his development of the total
factor productivity measure was that the observed share of labor cost in
revenue is an exact measure of the elasticity of the production function under
competition. For firms with market power, the corresponding measure is the
ratio of labor cost to output valued at marginal cost That is, the share
should be measured as wN/rQ, where x is marginal cost. Under competition,
where the firm equates marginal cost to the market price, the two measures
are the same. With market power, the share of labor cost in revenue
understates the elasticity of the production function with respect to labor,
because revenue includes monopoly profit.
To see what happens to the Solow residual with market power, letbe
the markup ratio or ratio of price to marginal cost, p= p/x, andlet a be the
share of labor cost in revenue, as before (a= wN/pQ). Then the elasticity of
the production function with respect to labor input is pa and the rate of
growth of output can be decomposed as:
=pgang+ (1—pa)Ak1 + 9, (8.1)
23Here I have written each of the variables with a time subscript to emphasize
that they can change over time. No assumptions of constancy of either s or
a is made. In what follows, as will always be considered time-seriesdata.
Under the null hypothesis of competition, phasthe constant value of one,
but there is no assumption of constancy under the alternative hypothesis.
The Solow residual under market power is:
—a5n5—(1—a)k=(p5—1)a5(n5—zk5)+ O (8.2)
The residual is no longer invariant in the presence of market power. Any
outside event that raises the labor/capital ratio will make the residual
positive. To simplify the discussion of the empirical test based on an
exogenous instrument, z, let me assume, without loss of generality,that the
instrument is positively correlated with the weighted growth of the
labor/capital ratio, a5(in5—kj). Then, from equation 8.2,
Proposition 5. Market power and invariance: In the presence of market
power, the covariance of an instrument and the Solowresidual is
positive.
In Hall [1988], I review the detailed conditions required to make Proposition
5 universal. First, if the markup ratio,isa constant, it is immediately
apparent that the covariance will be positive if and only if pexceedsone.
Second, the validity of the test based on the covariance extends to cases of
variable markup ratios. In particular, if the markup varies along with the
instrument in a linear fashion, and weighted employment growth also varies
linearly with the instrument, then market power will make the covariance
positive except in very unusual circumstances.
-
24Estimates of the degree of market power
Under the additional hypothesis that the markup ratio, p,isroughly
constant, its value can be estimated by applying instrumental variables to
equation 8.1. However, these estimates often have very large standard errors.
High apparent dispersion will occur whenever an instrument is strongly
correlated with output but weakly correlated with weighted factor input.
The high dispersion does not convey any uncertainty about the failure of
invariance—that hypothesis would require that the covariances of output and
weighted input with the instrument be the same. Rather, the uncertainty is
over how much greater than unity is i.Amore informative procedure is to
estimate the reciprocal, p'.Bymapping all values of greater than one into
the interval between zero and one, the procedure of estimating the reciprocal
gives a much more interpretable estimate of the sampling variation of the
estimate of p.
Table2 gives estimates of 1/p with their standard errors. These
estimates make use of all three instruments together by using the two-stage
least squares estimator. The interpretation of these estimates must heed the
warnings of section 3 with respect to the use of data on value added. The
implicit estimate of pmeasuresthe ratio of price less materials cost (the
valued-added deflator) to marginal cost excluding marginal materials cost.
Such an estimate always overstates p',theratio of price to full marginal cost.
The estimates of pinTable 2 range from a little under 2 to a little under 4.
That is, of the total value added per unit of sales, only 25 to 55 percent is
marginal cost; the rest is earnings from market power. The deviations from
invariance of the Solow productivity residual documented in Table 2
correspond to economically significant amounts of market power.
25TABLE 2
Estimates of markup ratio
at one-digit level
Estimate of Standard Estimate of
Industry reciprocal error markup ratio,
Construction .455 .103 2.196
Durable Goods .486 .111 2.058
Nondurable Goods .323 .102 3.096
Transportation & .313 .119 3.199
Public Utilities
Trade .264 .109 3.791
Finance, insurance .303 .167 3.300
& real estate
Services .536 .187 1.864
Estimates of markup ratio at two-digit level
20: Food and kindred .189 .144 5.291
products
21: Tobacco .362 .193 2.766
manufacturing
22: Textile mill .388 .160 2.578
products
23: Apparel and other 1.213 .592 .824
textile mill products
24: Lumber and wood .555 .223 1.801
25: Furniture .506 .118 1.977
26TABLE 2 (continued)
Estimates of markup ratio
at two-digit level
Estimate of Standard Markup
Industry reciprocal error ratio,
26: Paper and allied .269 .060 3.716
products
27: Printing and .070 .294 14.263
publishing
28: Chemicals and .050 .067 20.112
allied products
29: Petroleum and coal -.007 .122 -139.478
30: Rubber and miscellaneous.663 .249 1.508
plastic products
31: Leather and .476 .337 2.100
leather products
32: Stone, clay and .394 .090 2.536
glass products
33: Primary metal industries .460 .100 2.172
34: Fabricated metal products.607 .232 1.649
35: Machinery, except .700 .265 1.429
electrical
36: Electric and electronic .324 .175 3.086
equipment
38: Instruments and .716 .540 1.397
related products
27TABLE 2 (continued)
Estimates of markup ratio
at two-digit level
Estimate of Standard Markup
Industry reciprocal error ratio,
39: Miscellaneous manufacturing .223 .130 4.491
48: Communication .028 .998 36.313
49: Electric, gas and .079 .290 12.591
sanitary services
371: Motor vehicles .567 .191 1.763
and equipment
372-79: Other transportation1.053 .413 .950
equipment
Transportation .251 .196 3.976
Wholesale Trade -.271 .366 -3.688
Retail Trade .425 .109 2.355
Instruments: defense expenditures, price of oil, and political party
28The lower part of Table 2 presents estimates of i/p for the more detailed
industries. Not every industry shows evidence of marketpower. For exam-
ple, in apparel (SIC 23), i/p is slightly, but not significantly, greater than
one.
Explanation 2: Increasing returns
A firm operating at a point of increasing returns must have market
power to be viable; absent some monopoly profit, it cannot generate enough
revenue to pay for its inputs. Hence it is appropriate to consider how the
original Solow residual moves when there is a combination of marketpower
and increasing returns. Letbe the returns to scale index, that is, the
elasticity of output with respect to both inputs:
—KOFNOF 83 7* -
Underconstant returns, 7=1. It is not hard to show that the Solow residual
has an extra term for increasing returns (7>1):
=(pg—1)a(n—kj)÷
(7t—1)ikg+9 (8.4)
If an exogenous instrument is positively correlated withinvestment,
invariance of the Solow residual will fail both because of marketpower (the
p_i term) and because of increasing returns (the 7—1 term).The
asymmetry in the Solow residual in equation 8.4 results from the original
asymmetry in the construction of the residual, which uses labor's share in
revenue to infer the elasticity with respect to labor and assumes that the
elasticity with respect to capital is one minus labor's share.
29Behavior of the cost-based residual under increasing returns
The cost-based residual of an optimizing firm with power in its output
market and a constant-returns technology should obey invariance.The
residual uses the cost share to measure the elasticity of output with respect to
labor input. In the presence of fixed costs or other failures of constant
returns, the cost share understates the true elasticity: Then, as aresult of
the understatement, the cost-based residual would incorporate too small an
adjustment for variations in labor input and the residualitself would rise
every time output rose.
To understand the effect of increasing returns on the cost-based Solow
residual, it is useful to restate the later steps of the derivation of thatresidual
without the assumption of constant returns. As before, letbe the elasticity
of the production function with respect to all of its inputs; 7>1 in the caseof
increasing returns. Then the marginal products of labor and capital are:
OF_ tiryQ— Q. TR_rk+wN_a7N,
ryQ 86 —rk+wN
—( —a)7-J
Solve as before to get:
=7[aIn+(1—a)Ak]+0. (8.7)
The percent change in output is the weighted percent changes in inputs,
multiplied by the returns-to-scale index, .Theweights for the inputs arc
the corresponding cost shares, a and 1—a. Ifis roughly a constant, then
equation 8.7 is an estimating equation:can be estimated as the ratio of the
actual change in output, q,tothe amount by which output should change
30under constant returns, tthii +(1— when some exogenous event changes
product demand or factor supplies. Equation 8.7 adds a productivitygrowth
term, 9, as in my earlier discussion of the original Solow residual.
Under increasing returns, The cost-based Solowproductivity residual
q—thn—(1_a)k =(7—1)(an+ (1—a)k] + 9 . (8.8)
Under market power and constant returns to scale(=1), the cost-based
Solow residual is invariant toexogenous changes in output. Only true shifts
of the production function make the residual depart fromzero. On the other
hand, with increasing returns (7>1), the residual is positive whenoutput
rises, even when there has been no shift of the production function. The
residual confuses increases in scale with shifts of theproduction function.
Thus,
Propostion 6. Increasing returns and invariance: In thepresence of
increasing returns, the covariance of an instrnmental variable and either
version of the Solow residual is positive.
The cost-based Solow residual has the importantproperty that it
measures the shift of the production function correctly in thepresence of
market power. Solow's original approach has thedisadvantage of recording
false movements of the production function for firms withmarket power,
even with constant returns to scale. When revenue exceedscost, because of
pure monopoly profit, the revenue share of labor understates the elasticity of
output with respect to labor input. When someexogenous event raises labor
input relative to capital input, the revenue-based Solow residual failsto
account for all of the increase in output, because it gives too littleweight to
labor.
31Comparison of the original and cost-based Solowresiduals
With increasing returns and market power, the original Solowresidual
q_aAn—(1—a)k =(p_1)a(n_k)+(7_1)1k+O. (8.9)
With a measured as a cost share rather than a revenue share,the cost-based
residual is
q_an—(1—a)Lk =(7_1)[an+ (i—a)k] + 0. (8.10)
The original residual fails invariance under either market power orincreasing
returns; the cost-based residual fails invariance onlyunder increasing returns.
To put it differently, the original residual can provideinformation about
market power, but the cost-based residual can provideinformation only about
increasing returns.
Evidence of the magnitude of increasing returns
Measuring the precision of the estimate of -y hasthe same problem as
for p—when the evidence is strong that y has a high value,the standard error
is very large. Hence it is appropriate to estimaterather than 'y. These
estimates appear in Table 3. They show that the failureof constant returns
in many industries is quite profound. The estimated elasticityof output with
respect to total input, y, is above 1.5 inall one-digit industries in Table 3
save services. In three industries —nondurables,transportation-utilities, and
trade—output risesby more than three percentwhen an outside force makes
input rise by one percent. In Table 3, 7 of the23 industries have returns-to-
scale indexes of greater than three.
32TABLE 3
Estimates of the index of returns to scale at one-digit level
Estimate of Standard Estimate of
Industry reciprocal error index,
Construction .597 .277 1.675
Durable Goods .543 .128 1.841
Nondurable Goods .322 .110 3.107
Transportation & .100 .169 10.030
Public Utilities
Trade .224 .178 4.468
Finance, insurance .353 .250 2.830
& real estate
Services .926 .220 1.080
Estimates of the index of returns to scale at two-digit level
20: Food and kindred .030 .132 33.557
products
21: Tobacco .256 .358 3.909
manufacturing
22: Textile mill .500 .152 1.999
products
23: Apparel and other .933 .271 1.072
textile mill products
24: Lumber and wood .725 .276 1.379
33TABLE 3 (continued)
Estimates of the index of returns to scale at two-digit level
Estimate of Standard Estimate of
Industry reciprocal error index, j'
25: Furniture .736 .141 1.359
26: Paper and allied .208 .079 4.810
products
27: Printing and .384 .165 2.605
publishing
28: Chemicals and .007 .091 138.889
allied products
29: Petroleum and coal -.309 .187 -3.236
30: Rubber and misc. .606 .144 1.650
plastic prod.
31: Leather and .212 .238 4.710
leather products
32: Stone, clay and .461 .109 2.170
glass products
33: Primary metal .351 .117 2.852
industries
34: Fabricated metal .230 .249 4.352
products
35: Machinery, except .681 .168 1.469
electrical
36: Electric and elec- .447 .166 2.237
tronic equipment
34TABLE 3 (continued)
Estimates of the index of returns to scale at two-digit level
Estimate of Standard Estimate of
Industry reciprocal error index, '
38:Instruments and .474 .358 2.111
related products
39: Misc. manufacturing .182 .156 5.491
48: Communication .834 .736 1.199
49: Electric, gas and .496 .206 2.016
sanitary services
371: Motor vehicles .382 .189 2.621
and equipment
372-79: Other trans- .886 .123 1.129
portation equipment
Instruments: defense expenditures, price of oil, and political party
35Ezplanaiion 3:External technwoi complement.arities
Although my discussion has considered increasing returns in the firm's
own technology, the invariance properties will also fail when the firm's
technology has constant returns but there is an externality that makes one
firm's output complementary with other firms' output. The thick-market
externality discussed by Diamond [19821 is a leading example. The extremely
uneven geographical distribution of economic activity suggests thatthick-
market effects are strong. Efficiency is greater in places and at times when
suppliers, workers, and customers are dense. The overall technology of an
industry with a thick-market externality will have increasing returns even
though each firm has constant returns.Caballero and Lyons [1989] use
methods based on the Solow residual to measure the importance of
externalities across U.S. manufacturing industries.They conclude that
externalities rather than increasing returns within industries are the most
important source of the failure of the invariance of the Solow residual.
Thick-market effects internal to the firm may be an important source
of increasing returns for the firm, as well.Consider a package delivery
service. When its customers become more numerous, its operations become
more efficient because each truck can make more stops in each area, and
deliver more packages per mile of driving.
Explanxtion4:Chronic excess capacity
If firms consistently hold more than the optimal amount of capital,
invariance of the original Solow residual will hold but invariance of the cost-
based residual will fail. With chronic excess capacity, the firm's costs would
be higher than appropriate, so the cost share of labor would understate the
true elasticity of output with respect to labor input. The revenue share of a
36competitive, constant-returns firm or industry will measure the elasticity
correctly. Some theories of the strategic interaction of firms have suggested
the desirability of capacity above the cost-minimizing level for the realized
distribution of output. Excess capacity makes credible a threat to revert to
competition.
Explanation 5: Unmeasured fluctuations in work effort and hours
A significant problem of measurement of labor input arises if labor has
two dimensions, hours and effort. Suppose, for concreteness, that hours,h,
andeffort, 1, multiply to form labor input, n.If fluctuations in effort are
ignored in computing n, invariance of the Solow residual will occur even
with competition and constant returns. The residual with a correct measure
of the change in labor input measures technicalprogress correctly:
— — (1—a)k=9 (8.11)
Supposethat only a fraction &ofvariations in labor input take the form of
changes in hours; the rest take the form of variations in work effort. Then ih
=bnand the Solow residual based on hours is not a proper measure of
productivity growth:
—ah — (1—a)k = ah + 9 (8.12)
Theresidual based on hours rather than total labor input will have a positive
covariance with an exogenous instrument because of the extra term on the
right-hand side. The error in measuring labor input leads to a false rejection
of invariance.
Figure 1 shows the magnitude of the fluctuations in work effort needed
to explain the measured fluctuations in work effort per hour needed to
37Figure1 Work effort implied by invariance
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returns setting. I calculated the effort index by solving equation 8.11 for the
change in total labor input under the assumption that 0 is a constant. Then I
subtracted the measured change in hours to get the implied change in work
effort. According to Figure 1, work effort would have to have beenmore
than 10 percent above normal for three successive years in the mid-1960s,as
one example of the size of the unmeasured fluctuations in work effort needed
to explain the observed movements of the Solow residual.
One piece of direct evidence suggests that cyclical fluctuations in work
effort is not an important explanation of fluctuations in measured
productivity. Fay and Medoff [1985] surveyed almost two hundred managers
of manufacturing plants. They asked the managers wether the work effort of
blue collar workers increased or decreased when output fell from a peak to a
trough. Somewhat more of the managers reported an increase in work effort
during a slump than reported a decrease.
The work effort variable, f, can be interpreted as accomplishmentsper
hour. Under this interpretation, the assumption that output depends on the
product of accomplishments per hour and hours of work says that the unit of
labor input is the accomplishment. In a competitive labor market under this
assumption, workers would be paid a piecerate per accomplishment equal to
the marginal value of an accomplishment. One of the ways of appraising the
unmeasured-work-effort explanation of the finding of positive covariances of
the Solow residual with instruments is to ask about its implications for labor
supply. With the piecework technology, firms are indifferent between various
combinations of hours and effort that yield the same volume of
accomplishments. The split between hours and effort is based purely on the
preferences of workers. In this setting, the parameter t' is interpreted as the
ratio of the elasticity of the supply ofhours with respect to the peicerate to
the elasticity of the supply of accomplishments with respect to thatwage. A
value ofof 0.5, for example, means that a decline in the piecerate brings
equal percentage declines in effort and hours. Workers with those preferences
39respond to lower piecerates by working less intensively. Theycould reduce
their hours twice as much by continuing the same level of effort,but instead
they choose more leisure on the job.
Figure 2 shows that the unmeasured-work-effort explanationof the
failure of the invariance of the Solow residual must rely heavily on the theory
of wage smoothing. The figure shows the actual hourly wage and the hourly
wage computed as the ratio of compensation tothe adjusted measure of labor
input underlying Figure 8.1. The inferred wage is to be interpreted as
compensation per accomplishment. Movements of the inferred wage are
implausible.In the expansion of the mid-1960s, the inferred piecerate
actually declined; in the highly inflationary expansion of the early 1970s,it
remained level. It is highly unlikely that the market-clearing piecerate wage
moved along the inferred path.Rather, the unmeasured-work-effort
explanation of the failure of invariance must assert that compensationis
decoupled from hours of work or work effort. The bulges of intensework
effort in Figure 8.1 were not paid for on a current basis by employers.
Instead, workers provided the extra labor input in accord with long-term
agreements, if the unmeasured-work-effort story is to be believed.
Measurement error in hours
Purely random measurement errors in the change in labor input, n,
uncorrelated with the instrumental variabale, do not lead to rejection of
invariance of the Solow residual. However, the hypotheses that spring to
mind about errors in n suggest they would be negatively correlated with z.
Suppose, for example, that some workers always report 40 hours of work per
week even though they work more hoursn demand is strong and fewer when
it is weak.. The the correlation is plainly negative.Such a negative
correlation could explain the finding of positive covariances of the Solow
residual with the instrument, because labor growth is subtracted in
calculating the residual. In formal terms, if hisan erroneous measure of
40Figure2. Wage adjusted for work effort
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1960 1970 1980n, such that a fraction 1— of movements in n are omitted from h,then
the situation is formally the same as in the previous case of unmeasured
fluctuations in work effort.An industry with constant returns and
competition would be diagnosed as having increasing returns and market
power, in that situation, when in fact the problem was the understatementof
fluctuations in labor input.All of my earlier remarks on unmeasured
fluctuations in work effort also apply to measurement errors in hours of work:
The measurement errors would have to be quite large in order to explain the
movements of the Solow residual, arid it is untenable that workers are being
paid on a current basis for the extra hours they work that are not recorded in
the data.
The likely source of errors in measuring total employee-hours is
presumably in hours per worker, rather than in the count of workers.
However, changes in the number of workers account for most of the variation
in employee-hours.In the data used in this paper for non-durables, the
standard deviation of the annual first difference of weekly hours per worker is
just 1.2 percent.On the other hand, the standard deviation of the
measurement error in hours needed to eliminate fluctuations in the Solow
residual is 5.0 percent. In order to interpret the movements of the residual as
caused by measurement errors in hours of work, rather than a failure of
competition and constant returns, the unmeasured fluctuations in hours
would have to dwarf the measured fluctuations, which I find implausible.
A second reason to be skeptical of major measurement errors in hours
of work is that the data make maximal use of all available information on
hours. For workers paid by the hour, the data rely on data reported by
employers. For workers paid on a salary basis (without reporting of hours),
data on hours are taken from the Current Population Survey data from
households.
42Ezplanaiion 6: Errors in measuring capital
An important implicit assumption of this line of work is that capital
input is correctly measured. The measure of capital used is the amount of
capital available for use. As long as capital has no pure user cost, it is
reasonable to assume that all capital available is in use. If there is apure
user cost—if capital depreciates in use rather than just over time—then the
situation is different. There is a capital supply decision similar to the labor
supply decision and presumably fluctuations in capital input occur in parallel
to fluctuations in output. I should note at the outset that if capital is out of
use because it is redundant—its shadow value is zero—then there is no bias in
my procedure. The dangerous case is when capital has a positive shadow
value and there are unmeasured fluctuations in utilization.
Though it is not possible to dispose of this hypothesis as a complete or
partial explanation of the failure of invariance, it is possible to show that it
calls for rather extreme movements of the true capital stock, corresponding to
substantial pure user costs of capital. Let v be the change in measurement
error of capital actually in use and letbe the change in measured capital
(i=ik-i-v). Then the Solow residual, calculated with measured rather
than actual capital, under constant returns, will be:
=—(1—a)v. (8.13)
Because capital measurement errors are likely to be negatively correlated
with output changes (an increase in output raises unmeasured capital
utilization and lowers v), the errors are likely to contribute to a failure of the
invariance condition in the direction found in this paper. For example,
suppose that the change in capital measurement error is proportional to the
change in labor input per unit of measured capital,
=—(Ln— . (8.14)
43Strict complementarity of work hours and capital hours would mean that
had the value of one. Then the Solow residual is
Aq —an —(1 — = 4,(i—a)(n— . (8.15)
Estimation of 4, by instrumental variables answers the following
question: What magnitude of measurement error would be requiredto
explain the observed failure of the invariance condition under constant
returns? The answer turns out to be a very large magnitude, well above the
intuitive maximum of 4, =1.For nondurables, the results of estimation with
the three instruments are:
q—txn—(1—&)ik =.0549—5.034 (1—a)(n — . (8.16)
(.012) (1.606)
Inorder to explain the magnitude of the correlation of the Solow residual
with the instruments, the elasticity of the measurement error with respect to
the change in labor input must be implausibly large—around 5. The simple
model in which capital and labor fluctuate in proportion, with 4, =1,is not
nearly enough to explain the findings of the research.
Explanation 7: Errors in measuring output
The hoarding of labor during cyclical contractions is probably an
important element of the explanation of cyclical fluctuations in productivity,
though, as I will show later, such an explanation almost certainly involves a
failure of competition and constant returns. However, labor-hoarding could
induce a measurement error in output that would cause the method of this
paper to overstate the extent to which invarianceof the Solow residual fails.
Specifically, hoarded workers may be put to work on projects other than the
44production of output. They may repair equipment, build new facilities, train
themselves or others, and engage in many other investment activities.
Though the NIPA data attempt in principle to include some of these items in
output, many are no doubt unmeasured.
Fay and Medoff [1985] document the importance of investment
activities during slumps in output. In the typical contraction suffered by
their respondents, output fell by 31 percent, while the increase in investment
activities by workers was about 3 percent of their normal hours. The
resulting upward bias in yisthe ratio of these two numbers, or about 0.1.
An industry with constant returns with the amount of unrecorded output
found by Fay and Medoff would have an estimated returns to scale index of
1.1, far below the estimates reported earlier. Only a small fraction of the
observed failure of invariance of the Solow residual can be attributed to
unobserved output.
Explanation 8: Monopsony power in the labor market.
A basic maintained hypothesis of this research is that the firm chooses
an optimal level of employment. All of the derivations make the assumption
that the marginal revenue product of labor is equated to the wage. An
alternative is that the firm employs too few workers, on the average. Then
the measured cost share of labor would understate the true elasticity because
of the understatement of effective labor cost, and the covariance of the cost-
based residual and an instrument would be explained. For example, if the
typical firm has strong monopsony power in its labor market, a failure of the
invariance property would occur in the observed direction.But the
conditions under which this could be expected to persist for long periods are
strenuous. First, if there is bilateral bargaining with a labor union, one would
not expect to find a shadow value of labor in excess of the observed wage.
Both parties could be made better off by attracting a worker from the open
45market and paying the worker the prevailing union wage. And if theunion
has much monopoly power, it is likely to succeed in pushing theobserved
wage above the shadow value, by extracting a lump-sumcomponent of
compensation as part of an efficient bargain.
Second, the firm has a strong incentive to overcome its monopsony
position in the labor market by attracting workers from moredistant
markets. When it can only get more work from its own local market by
driving up every worker's wage, it will turn to other markets. What matters
is the elasticity of labor supply from the entire labor market to the one firm
in the long run. It is hard to believe that this elasticity is anything less than
a very large number for most firms.
Non-explanations
Although quite a variety of conditions might explain the widespread
failure of invariance of the Solow productivity residual, some of the
conditions that come to mind are actually incapable of explaining the finding.
Among these are labor hoarding and overhead labor, wage smoothingand
other cyclical errors in measuring wages, adjustment costs for labor input.
Non-explanation 1: Overhead labor and labor hoarding
A number of authors have suggested that labor hoarding is an alternative
explanation of the failure of invariance of the Solow residual.That
suggestion is incorrect. The overhead labor technology, which is the simplest
model that generates labor hoarding, fits all of the assumptions of the
invariance theorems including constant returns. Hence the Solow residual is
invariant for a cost-minimizing firm with an overhead labor technology, Of
course, residuals for industries with obvious signs oflabor hoarding frequently
fail invariance. The correct conclusion is that one of the assumptions
underlying the invariance theorems does not hold. The leading possibility, in
46my opinion, is increasing returns. A second possibility is that firms do not
minimize expected costs and instead hold excess capacity. Data problems are
a third.
The following example will show how the original Solow residual is
invariant for an overhead labor technology. A price-taking firm has capacity
K. In order to produce any output at all, it must hire AK overhead workers.
In addition, for each unit of output, it must hire workers. Thus, to produce
a level of output Q, it must have a K at least as large as Q, and employment
of AK+Q. The firm's marginal cost is wqiwheneverQ < K and can be taken
to be any number above wqwhenthe capacity constraint is binding. In
competitive equilibrium, p =we wheneverQ < K and p￿t$wheneverQK.
Note that the technology has constant returns to scale (the fixed component
of labor is proportional to capacity, not absolutely fixed) so a competitive
equilibrium is possible. Now consider the Solow residual for a period when
output is below capacity. Labor's share will be
—wN—w(SQ+AK) 817 wQ (.)
Becausethe competitive firm operates at a loss whenever its output is below
capacity, the share exceeds one. The Solow residual is:
— = — (8.18)
—Q uQ+AK) Q —-wQ Q+AK
=0
Thusthe Solow residual remains unchanged when an outside force alters the
levels of output and employment. The covariance of the Solow residual and
an exogenous instrument is zero and the proposed test will reveal, correctly,
that the firm is competitive. Even though the variation in labor input itself
47may be very small, because mostworkers are overhead workers, the
competitive value of a exceeds one by enough to make aAn equal iq.The
mere existence of overhead labor does not lead tothe rejection of
competition.
In practice, for those industries that appear to have large overhead labor
requirements and small variable labor requirements, the behaviorof the labor
share a and the resulting covariance of the Solow residual and an instrument
are not at all what is described by the competitive model justsummarized.
Rather, when such an industry operates below capacity, its price remainsfar
above the cost of the variable component of labor.Profit often remains
positive, so labor's share, a, is less than one. The ratio of qtoain is, say,
three, not one. The appropriate conclusion is that price exceeds marginal
cost and there may be increasing returns as well. The Solow residual rises
sharply whenever an outside force causes employment and output to rise.
The most widely advocated explanation of the positive correlation of
output and productivity is that firms carry workers through slumps,because
discharging them would dissipate the value of their job-specific human
capital. In a simple version of the labor-hoarding model, the firm would lay
off only 4IQ of its workers, if a slump caused by adverse external
developments caused output to fall by Q. Additional workers would be
kept on even though they were idle. The economics are then identical to the
first example. Marginal cost is wçandthe competitive price should fall to
this level. Then a will be well above one, so that the Solow residual is
invariant to a shift in employment and output, even though the change in
output is much larger than the change in employment. However, ifthe firm
is not competitive, so that price does not fall enough to make a large, then
the Solow residual will rise when an outside force raises employment and
output.
A related result is that invariance of the cost-based Solow residual
holds for the noncompetitive firm with a constant-returns overhead labor
technology. The following example illustrates the point. Suppose that the
48technology is such that the level of employment required to produce output Q
is AK+Q+pmax(Q—K,O). That is, with a capital stock of K, overhead labor
of AK, and variable labor Q, it is possible to produce Q￿K units ofoutput.
Additional output requires an increment of 4'+p units of labor for each unit of
output above K. The shadow value of capital is —Aw when output is below K
because the firm could produce just as much output with lower overhead
labor if its capital were lower. The shadow value of capital is (p—A)w whenQ
exceeds K—in that regime, more capital requires more overhead workers but
reduces the requirement for the incremental labor described byp. Let /3 be
the probability that output will exceed K Then the expected shadow value
of capital is (flp—A)w. At the optimum capital stock, the expected shadow
value of capital equals the service price of capital, r.Hence,/3=(r/w+A)/p.
Suppose that the fluctuations in output are in a small region above and below
K, and, for convenience, scale output and capital so that K=1. The level of
employment is close to A+qS.The cost share, a, will be close to
(A+)/(A+qS+r/w).Becausethere is no true productivity change, the actual
change in output, Aq, is a valid instrument itself. Suppose that the capital
stock does not change over time. When output is below K, the change in
employment is /(A--)AQ and the cost-based residual is equal to
[l—a/(A+)]Aq. Thus the relation between the residual and the instrument
has slope 1—a/(A+). When output is above K, the change in employment,
AN, is (+p)AQ.Hence, the rate of growth of employment, An, is
approximately (+p)/(A+)Aq. The slope of the relation between the cost-
based residual Aq—aAn and Aq is 1—a(4--p)/(A+). Theaverage slope is
(l—$)[1—a/(A+)]+fl[1_a(+p)/(A÷)1. Inserting the values for 3 and a
derived above shows that the average slope is zero.
In the example, it is true that when the firm is in the labor-hoarding
regime (Q is below K), the covariance of the cost-based residual and the
instrument would be strongly positive.However, this is exactly
counterbalanced by a negative covariance when output is above K. What if a
firm spent most of its time in the labor-hoarding regime and hadoutput
49above K only in times of extreme demand? Isn't this the normal casefor
most firms? The answer is that such a firm is not satisfying the conditionfor
optimal investment; it has excess capacity.As a general matter, the
condition for optimal choice of capacity guarantees the invariance of the cost-
based Solow residual.
Labor hoarding and overhead labor are probably important phenom-
ena in many industries. When a firm is in a labor-hoarding regime,its cost-
based residual will be positively correlated with an instrument. In that
respect, labor hoarding is an essential part of the explanationof the findings
of this research. However, labor hoarding is not an alternative explanation of
the failure of the invariance property.Fixed costs or other types of
increasing returns are likely to underlie chronic operation in a labor-hoarding
regime. A firm with a constant returns technology and an optimal
investment strategy, no matter how ridden with forecasting errors, will spend
enough time in a labor-shortage regime to offset the time spent in thelabor-
hoarding regime.As the example shows, the condition for optimal
investment amounts to stating that the two regimes combine in such a way
as to eliminate any covariance of the cost-based residual with aninstrument.
Cyclical errorsinmeasuring labor's share
Errors in measuring the value of athatare correlated with the instrument
but which do not affect the mean value of aarebenign in this framework.
Examples of measurement errors with this character are (1) paymentof
workers under wage smoothing arrangements, where the wage equal the long-
run opportunity cost of time, but does not track short-run fluctuationsin
labor-market conditions, (2) adjustment costs in employment, where the full
marginal cost of incremental hours of work fluctuates above and below the
observed wage, and (3) price rigidity, where prices are set at the long-run
average of marginal cost.
50Under wage smoothing, workers receive less than their marginal products
in good times and more in bad times. Hence the shareis understated in
good times and overstated in bad times. When the instrument is positive
and consequently output growth and employment growth are also positive,
the Solow residual measured with too small an a is also positive. A positive
term enters the covariance of the instrument and the residual. On the other
hand, when the instrument, output growth, and employment growth are all
negative, the Solow residual is positive as well--the term —cthn is overstated
in a positive direction because n is negative. A negative term enters the
covariance of the instrument and the residual.In data with an
approximately equal mixture of good and bad times, the covariance will turn
out to be zero. That is, a competitive industry with wage smoothing will not
generate data that reject the invariance property.
Adjustment costs in employment have the same character as wage
smoothing. Half the time, the shadow cost of labor to the firm exceeds the
wage, and the measured value of a understates the true value. These are
times when the current change is in a direction that adds to adjustment
costs. The other half of the time, the shadow cost of labor falls short of the
wage because the current change in employment conserves adjustment costs.
There is no bias in labor's share, a, in the long run, but there are
measurement errors correlated with the instrument. But the errors cancel
out and there is no reason to expect to find a correlation of the Solow residual
and the instrument in a competitive industry with labor adjustment costs.
Price rigidity could arise in a competitive industry if firms find it
necessary to post prices before observing current demand. If firms stand
ready to serve all demand, then the same type of symmetry prevails as
described earlier. When demand is strong, a is overstated because the pQin
the denominator understates the true value of output based on marginal cost.
When demand is weak, a understates labor's share in marginal cost. But
there is no resulting correlation of the Solow residual and an instrument
correlated with demand. Rotemberg and Summers [1987] examine this case in
51more detail. They show that a positive covarianceof the Solow residual and
an instrument would arise if the firm's behavior is asymmetric,serving all
demand in the low demand states but rationing output if marginal cost
exceeds the predetermined price.
A general argument shows that none of these specification errors could
explain the failure of the invariance of the Solow residual.The first two
errors make the measured wage differ from the true effective wage overthe
cycle, but not in the long run. Such errors contribute to failure ofinvariance
only in a certain second-order way, and, in any case, the biasis toward
competition and constant returns. Similarly, price rigidity creates only a tiny
bias against invariance and could not explain an important element of the
observed failure of invariance.
Suppose that all of the assumptions hold that are needed to ensurethe
invariance of the Solow residual.Then the true Solow residual,
q—an—(1—a)ik, will be uncorrelated with the instrument, z.Now
suppose that an erroneous labor share, &,isused in place of a in forming the
Solow residual. It may differ from a because of wage smoothing, adjustment
costs, price rigidity, or any other reason. I will assume thatis constant
over time, which is generally a close approximation. Thenthe covariance of
the residual and the instrument is
Coq_àn—(1—â)k4z] =— Cov{(à—a)(n—ik)4z] (8.19)
Considerthe following representation of the factors in the covariance:
a—a =—b1z+ 'h (8.20)
= —a2+ b2x + q (8.21)
= b3x+ (8.22)
Herez is the systematic part of the instrument.It has mean zero and
variance one, without loss of generality. I also assume that x has zero third
52moment. A sufficient condition for the last property is that the distribution
ofis symmetric. The random variables ,havezero means and are
independent of each other and of z. The measurement error in the labor
share, a—dy,hasa negative correlation with x, controlled by the coefficient b1.
The rate of growth of the labor/capital ratio, n—k, has a negative mean
and a positive correlation with x, controlled by the coefficient, b2. Under
these assumptions, the covariance of the Solow residual and the instrument is
—Cot4(&—a)(n—k)4zJ =—a2b1b3 . (8.23)
Allof the other terms vanish because they are third moments, which have
been assumed to be zero. The one remaining term is a second moment times
a first moment. The basic point can be seen most easily by assuming that
the mean growth of the labor/capital ratio, n—k, 02,iszero. In that case,
when demand rises and x is positive, the error in the labor share, &—,is
negative. Growth in the labor/capital ratio is also negative, so the product,
(&—a)(n—k), is positive.The instrument, z, is positive, so the
contribution to the covariance is positive. On the other hand, when demand
falls and x is negative, the error in the labor share, &—a, is positive. Growth
in the labor/capital ratio is also positive, so the product, (&—a)(n—k), is
positive.The instrument, A:, is negative, so the contribution to the
covariance is negative. On net, the cova.riance is zero.
When the average growth of the labor/capital ratio is negative (02>0),
thecovariance of the Solow residual and the instrument is negative.
Rejection of invariance in the form of a positive covariance with an
instrument cannot be explained by cyclical measurement errors in the labor
share that are negatively correlated with the instrument, that is,
understatement of the labor share when demand is strong.Even
measurement errors that overstate the labor share when demand is strong
have only a slight effect on the covariance, because in all-industries, the trend
growth rate of the labor/capital ratio, 02,isquite small. I summarize in
53Proposition 7. Irrelevance of cyclical measurement errors:Under the
assumptions stated above, cyclical errors in measurement of thelabor
share cannot cause a positive covariance of the Solow residual with an
instrument.
Non-explanation 2: Wage smoothing
I will consider two sources of measurement error in the wage. For the
revenue-based share, the proportional error in the share equals the
proportional error in the wage, assuming the other elements of the share tobe
measured correctly. For the cost-based share, the proportional error in the
share is smaller than the proportional error in the wage, because the wage
appears in both the numerator and the denominator.
One potential source of measurement error in the wage is wage
smoothing. Martin Neil Baily's [1974] pioneering paper pointed outthe
advantage to workers of earning smoothed wages. When workers cannot use
credit markets as easily as employers can, then it makes sense to decouple
earnings from labor-market fluctuations. In the extreme case, workersreceive
a predetermined real annual income, unrelated to the amountof work they
do and unrelated to the value of their time. Though such an arrangement
could be examined with the aid of Proposition 7, I have taken a less extreme
view. Suppose that workers receive a guaranteed hourly wage, but the wage
is paid only for hours actually worked. Those hours are determined not by
equating the value of the marginal product of labor to the wage,but rather
by equating the value of the marginal product to the marginal valueof time.
The error in measuring the share arises because the effective wage is the
value of time, but the measured wage is the predetermined contract wage.
However, if the market for employment contracts is competitive,the
smoothed wage will equal the marginal value of time averaged over the
54duration of the typical contract.
When an increase in product demand raises output and employment,
it raises the value of time and hence raises the true share of labor. A share
computed from the smoothed wage understates the movement of the true
share; this is true both for the revenue- and cost-based shares. Proposition 7
applies—the consequence is a slight downward bias in the covariance of the
Solow residual, and the instrument. The cyclical error in the labor share does
not bias the covariance.
Non-ezplanation 3: Adjustment costs
A second potential source of cyclical departures of the effective
marginal cost of labor from the quoted wage could arise from adjustment
costs for labor. Mark Bils [1987] has investigated the ways that adjustment
costs enter the effective marginal cost.In a simple setup where costs of
adjustment are quadratic in the proportional change in effective labor input,
the marginal cost of adding an hour of labor input in year iis
= gn— . (8.24)
Heretisthe measured hourly wage and g is a parameter with the following
interpretation: If g is 1, at a time when employment has risen by 10 percent,
the marginal adjustment cost of labor is 1/10 of the direct labor cost.
With this specification of adjustment costs, the error in the labor share
=—g&(n—njj). (8.25)
In almost all industries, the serial correlation of An is negative, so the
covariance of n—n4.1 and the instrument is almost certainly positive.
Thus the error in the labor share is negatively correlated with the instrument
55and Proposition 7 shows that there is a slight downwardbias in the
covariance of the instrument with the Solow residual. Adjustmentcosts
cannot explain the finding of a positive covaxiance.
Non-explanation 4: Price rigidity
A good deal of research has reached the conclusion that product prices
fluctuate less as demand changes than is predicted by the competitivemodel.
Do rigid prices explain the failure of the invariance of the Solowresidual?
The answer is no. If price rigidity is itself unbiased—if marginal cost spends
as much time below price as above—then theSolow residual will be
uncorrelated with an exogenous demand instrument.Recall that the
competitive labor share is
(8.26)
Substitute Y= NI Q, the labor/output ratio, and solve for the price:
p= wY. (8.27)
This is the "price equation" under competition —theprice is proportional to
cost, measured by the wage, w, and increases withthe labor/output ratio.
Under a simple characterization of price rigidity, the variable labor/output
ratio, Y, is replaced by a long-run average, ':
= iwV . (8.28)
Under the assumption that the firm supplies whatever quantity of output is
demand by its customers at the price i,theproper measure of the labor share
for the Solow residual is still a —the price pismarginal cost. If the residual is
calculated mistakenly with the share & based on j,itis easy to show that the
56resulting error in the share is
= . (8.29)
Note that this error in the share is positively correlated with the demand
instrument, so the Solow residual will be positively correlated with the
instrument, even with competition and constant returns.However, the
correlation is very small.
To keep the discussion simple, I will assume that the labor share can
be treated as a constant. The natural metric for the covariance of the
instrument and the residual is the covariance of the instrument and the
weighted change in the labor/capital ratio, (n—ik), because the ratio of
the two covariances is the estimate of p—i. In terms of the representation
presented earlier in this section, the ratio is
(8.30)
Some manipulations reveal that
b1 =—Cov(criy4x) (8.31)
b2= (8.32)
where y= log Y. Let
C1 =Cov(y4z,..1) (8.33)
Then
b1 C0—C1 = '2C0—C..1—C
57If the two cross-covariances, C1 and C1, are close to each otherandsmaller
than C0, then
=—a(1—a) (8.35)
and the bias in the estimate of pis
(8.36)
This bias is tiny. For example, if ais0.7 and a is .02, the bias is 0.003.
Price ridigidty cannot explain any meaningful amount of thefailure of
invariance.
9. Subsequent research
The results reported here are strongly confirmed by subsequent research in
the framework developed here carried out by Domowitz, Hubbard,and
Petersen [1987]. D-H-P have a rich body of data on extremelydetailed
industries. The data report gross output and materials inputs, so that it is
not necessary to work with value added. By pooling industrieswithin two-
digit categories, D-H-P are able to achieve much greater powerthan the tests
of this paper. They find extremely strong rejection of competition in most
manufacturing industries.
Shapiro [1987], using data similar to those of this paper,extends this
framework to estimate the elasticity of market demand jointly with the ratio
of price to marginal cost. He confirms the basic finding of market power in
numerous industries.
5810. Conclusions
The assumptions Solow made in developing the now-standard
approach to productivity measurement are clearly false.Under the
assumptions, productivity growth should be uncorrelated withexogenous
variables that induce changes in output but do not shift the production
function. In fact, productivity growth is highly correlated with oilprices,
quite correlated with military spending, and somewhat correlated with the
political party of the president. The correlation does not arise simply because
of market power; a simple modification of the Solow residual eliminates the
bias in factor shares caused by monopoly profit, but the modified Solow
residual has the same failure of invariance as does the original residual.
Of the many explanations considered in thispaper, one of the most
salient is monopolistic competition. With free entry and fixedcosts, firms
will reach a zero-profit equilibrium in which both the original and cost-based
Solow residuals will fail invariance.Increasing returns is the basic
explanation in this case.
A second leading explanation is massive errors in the data. What
matters is not measured hours of work, but work effort. People work harder
when there is more work to do. Employment arrangements allocate valuable
work effort in a way that is not reflected in currentwages.The
understatement of fluctuations in labor input inresponse to changes in
output induced by the exogenous instruments is the explanation of the failure
of invariance.
A third explanation, harmonious with a major new strand ofthought
in macroeconomics, is that firms enjoy thick-market external benefits when
output is high. When an exogenous event stimulates economic activity, it
shifts the firm's production function upward.
All of these leading explanations represent important departures from
standard economic thought. Failure of invariance of the Solow residual isa
fact that needs to be taken into account in micro and macroeconomic models
59of firms, industries, and markets. Models with constant returnsand no
uobserved movements in work effort are simply inconsistent withthe data.
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